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THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
Iintend to talk about the idea of “constitutionalism” asadvertised. However, I obviously cannot do justice tothe entire history of one of humanity’s most sublime
conceptions in a mere 50 minutes. Instead, I will single
out for special attention a particular model of
contemporary constitutionalism – the model that looks to
constitutional adjudication as a way of transforming
economies and polities, societies and cultures.
While this model is popular today in both legal and
non-legal circles, it rests on a number of controversial
assumptions: that some authoritative text can be readily
identified as a constitution; that it assigns to each of the
three branches of government – and different levels of
government – distinct and exclusive roles; that it
entrenches fundamental rights against abuse by all levels
and branches; and that those rights are formally
justiciable. It also assumes that jurists – scholars, lawyers
and judges – possess a unique institutional and
intellectual capacity to comprehend the issues and to apply
the constitution to their resolution; that the political
culture acknowledges that capacity and accepts
constitutional litigation as a sensible way of dealing with
transformative change; and that in the end, such litigation
actually achieves what it promises.
This court-centred model of constitutionalism is usually
draped in the stars and stripes. By contrast, the British
model of constitutionalism – at least until recently – has
been built around three quite different notions: a largely
unwritten constitution, a unitary state and the supremacy
of the crown in Parliament. However, things are changing.
The British model of the constitution is gradually starting
to resemble the American. It is now to be found
increasingly in written texts; since 1950, or at least since
1998, it has partially entrenched human rights and, up to
a point, made them justiciable; it has begun to subject
Parliamentary legislation to judicial scrutiny; it has taken
significant steps towards disentangling legislative,
executive and judicial powers; and – further evidence of
Americanization – it is slowly drifting towards federalism,
albeit of a highly asymmetrical variety. Finally, many
British jurists – but also political scientists, journalists,
activists and ordinary citizens – seem to be attracted by
the prospect that fundamental rights will be
constitutionally entrenched and by the heroic litigation
and transformative adjudication that entrenchment
supposedly portends.
For a Canadian, these British developments have a
particular resonance. After all, when our federation was
formed in 1867, we expressed our desire to unite under
“a constitution similar in principle to that of the United
Kingdom”. Ironically, we re-affirmed that desire as
recently as 1982 at the very moment when we severed our
last constitutional ties with Westminster, adopted a made-
in-Canada constitution, declared it the supreme law of
the land, entrenched in it a Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, and by all doing these things, moved ourselves
significantly away from the British and towards the
American model of constitutionalism. And to compound
the irony, the United Kingdom itself seems no longer
committed to a “constitution similar in principle” to the
one before which Canadians have twice genuflected, and
genuflect still, in the preamble to their fundamental law.
This represents a quick summary of the first part of my
lecture, which I lack the time to deliver in full this evening.
I know that what I have said is contentious and that many
of you will rightly demand to be given chapter and verse,
which I will provide when I revise my text for publication.
For now, I can only ask you to willingly suspend disbelief
and accept provisionally what I have said about
developments in the United Kingdom and Canada.
As for the remaining parts of my lecture, those you
will have to endure more or less in full. In the second part
I try to explain why American-style court-centred
constitutionalism is an idea whose time has come. In the
third, I suggest that this idea, this model, of
constitutionalism cannot be sustained – that written texts,
entrenched rights and constitutional litigation do not and
cannot actually contribute much to fundamental social
and political transformations. And in the fourth and final
part of the lecture, I propose a moral to my story.
WHY CONSTITUTIONALISM? WHY NOW?
So, why constitutionalism, and why now? I am going to
propose a number of possible explanations.
The ascent of civilization
The first, which should appeal to the Whigs amongst
you, is that the ascent of society from status to contract,
first detected by Sir Henry Maine, continued on an
inexorable upward trajectory from contract to legislation,
and thence from legislation to constitution – whence it
could progress no further. The example par excellence of
the constitutional state is, on this view, America – that
shining city on the hill – whose glorious judge-led civil
rights revolution transformed it in the 1950s, ‘60s and
‘70s. Or so it seemed to those of us whose legal
hormones were stirred, whose scholarly imaginations
were shaped, whose juridical utopias were defined by
Brown v Board of Education and Roe v Wade.
Woodsworth said it first and best:
Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven! – Oh! Times,
In which the meagre, stale, forbidding ways
Of custom, law and statute took at once
The attraction of a country in romance!
But like Woodsworth’s revolutionary France, the
Warren Court’s America soon ceased to be “a country in
romance”. In just this past decade, its Supreme Court has
legitimated an illegitimate presidency; has signalled that
it is bored with Brown and determined to abort Roe; and
has been complicit in both the post-9/11 shock-and-awe
invasion of civil rights, and the neo-conservative surge
offensive against the last vestiges of Franklin Roosevelt’s
New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society.
Disillusion with electoral politics
A second, more likely, explanation for the increasing
appeal of constitutional adjudication as an instrument of
progressive reform is widespread disenchantment with
Parliament, with parties and with electoral politics.
People do not participate in civic activities; they are not
politically engaged; they do not even bother to vote.
Some blame the decline of Parliamentary democracy on
the social compression of time; others on the loss of
cultural homogeneity and social cohesion; others on the
rise of race and gender identity politics, on the dumbing-
down of the educational system, on the manipulation of
the media, on the baleful influence of corporate money and
lobbyists, on the abandonment by the mainstream
parties of ideological coherence and moral integrity, on
inherent flaws in our electoral processes and legislative
institutions.
Whatever the cause, the outcome seems clear enough:
supporters of progressive causes in particular seem to be
turning increasingly to constitutional litigation – rather
than to social or political mobilization – in order to
achieve their goals. If human and social rights were
formally constitutionalized, they reckon, the courts
would enforce them; if the courts enforced them,
governments would have to implement them; and if
governments implemented them, society would be
transformed. So reasonable, so simple, so quick, so cheap,
so sure.
Now, one can understand why constitutional litigation
appeals to those who have grown weary of unrewarding
drudgery on the New Jerusalem building site. One can
understand, too, why if rights are to hand, anyone might
be tempted to launch opportunistic litigation to liberate
asylum seekers, nab touring dictators, secure social
benefits for claimants improperly denied them or forestall
prison brutality, nuclear war and environmental
degradation. One cannot understand, however, why so few
progressive people detect the delicious irony of confiding
the fate of social and individual rights to judges who were
rightly regarded – until quite recently and with honourable
exceptions – as the very epitome of entrenched
conservatism.
Neo-liberalism
Mind you, the irony has not escaped everyone. Many
neo-liberals have also become keen on constitutionalism.
They imagine that constitutions can function as a “bridle
for Leviathan”, a device to reign in the great beast of state
regulation and benefaction which, for 200 years, has pulled
forward the project of progressive politics.
How does Levianthan’s bridle work? By protecting
property from uncompensated regulatory “takings”; by
requiring administrative tribunals to adhere to “fair” –
which is to say court-like – procedures notoriously
unsuited to the business at hand; by subjecting complex
state policies to simple-minded judicial review on grounds
of “reasonableness” or “substantive fairness” or
“proportionality”; by dispersing state powers vertically
amongst competing national, sub-national and supra-
national jurisdictions and horizontally amongst the three
branches of government; and – all else failing – by4
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providing corporations with opportunities for endless,
debilitating legal challenges to all forms of regulation.
Most of all, however, constitutionalism constrains
activist governments by changing our understanding of the
state and the relationship of citizens to it. Citizens, in the
neo-liberal view, come in two varieties, human and
corporate, and both are rights-bearing market actors,
rather than members of a political community. The
emphasis, accordingly, is on the constitutional vindication
of individual rights through litigation, rather than of
collective interests through political action.
Neo-liberals also believe that the ideal state is the
minimal state. By this standard, courts – “the least
dangerous branch” – have advantages over the other
institutions of government. They are relatively cheap to
operate, but deter over-use by the judicious imposition of
costs. They are procedurally passive, at least in the
common law world, and cannot initiate claims, search out
evidence, hire experts, invent arguments or even enforce
their own decrees. Their interventions are episodic rather
than strategic, situational rather than systemic. They
appear to offer definitive answers to questions which are,
alas, too complicated for such answers. Not without
reason, then, do neo-liberals laud the judiciary as the
guarantor of the state’s sovereignty, legitimacy and
fundamental values.
Globalization
Neo-liberalism bears the same relationship to
globalization as cleanliness does to godliness. That is why
I must say something next about the contribution of
globalization to the current popularity of
constitutionalism. Three quick points:
The first is that the global economic order, carrying on
business under the name and style of the Washington
Consensus, has become publicly committed to “good
governance”. One aspect of good governance is the
existence of an independent judiciary capable of
enforcing fundamental rights. Why should this be so?
Because well-governed states are likely to be relatively
stable and hence safe for business, and because if
property rights are acknowledged as “fundamental” or
“inviolable”, the courts can protect foreign investors
against confiscation or regulation by nationalist or activist
governments.
Second, the elaborate structure of treaties and
conventions which holds the global economy together
might itself be regarded as a constitution. Like domestic
constitutions, it entrenches a new legal logic in which the
economic trumps the social and the cosmopolitan trumps
the parochial. Like domestic constitutions, it imposes
juridical limits on national legislation. And like domestic
constitutions, the constitution of the global economy
purports to replace power with the rule of law and crass
politics with principled adjudication. This extended
constitutional metaphor – which has been used, for
example, by the architects of the World Trade Organization
– may have been intended to legitimate and
operationalize globalization; but it has had the unintended
effect of making powerful and influential people hostage
to the fortunes of constitutionalism.
A third and final link between globalization and
constitutionalism is the process I refer to as “globalization
of the mind”. A consensus has developed amongst right-
thinking people in most developed countries – including
yours and mine – that “we are all neo-liberals now”. For
odd and dubious reasons, as I have suggested, this
consensus view has come to include a commitment to
court-based constitutionalism. However, a movement of
critique and resistance has also emerged – a counter-
consensus if you will. That counter-consensus, in an
equally odd and dubious fashion, proposes that if
human, social and labour rights were somehow embedded
in the constitution of the global economy, if they were
inscribed in the fundamental documents governing
regional trade regimes such as NAFTA and the EU, if they
were accepted as universal norms immanent in all
forms of international ordering, if – especially – they
were acknowledged and enforced by competent trade
tribunals, neo-liberalism would have to harken to the
better angels of its nature.
Would that it were so. In the next part of my lecture,
I am going to try to persuade you that even well-
developed domestic systems of constitutional
adjudication do not actually accomplish very much. If
that is so, why should we expect more from global systems?
DOES CONSTITUTIONALISM ACTUALLY
MATTER – AND IF NOT, WHY NOT?
To frame the debate in this third part of my lecture, I am
going to ask a bold question: does constitutionalism
actually matter? Do countries which entrench
fundamental rights and empower their courts to enforce
them in fact experience more equality, more democracy,
more social justice than they would otherwise have done?
That is a difficult question in itself, but if the answer is
“yes”, one must then ask an even harder question: is the
constitutionalization of rights in those countries a cause or
an effect of their democratic character?
Based on the experience of the United States, one
would have to say that constitutionalism probably does
not matter. Here is a country with the longest experience
of court-centred constitutionalism, with the most
principled constitutional judges, the most ambitious
constitutional litigators, the most sophisticated
constitutional jurisprudence, the most profound
constitutional scholarship, the most-rights conscious
citizenry, the strongest tendency to place rights discourse
and litigation at the centre of its political culture. And
what does it have to show for it? Arguably, the most 5
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egregious social inequality of any advanced democracy, the
lowest level of engagement in democratic politics, the
most heavy-handed police forces, capacious prisons and
over-worked executioners, and the greatest willingness to
tolerate cruel, coercive and intrusive state action in the
name of “homeland security”.
I leave it to members of this audience to say whether the
United Kingdom has become a less repressive state, a
more equal society and a more vibrant democracy, since
its accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights in 1950 or its enactment of the Human Rights Act
of 1998. I suspect that at least some of you would respond
that in recent years there has been a massive increase in
state surveillance and coercion, a declining tolerance for
free speech and deviant beliefs and behaviour, and
diminishing accountability for the abuse of state power. As
for Canada, I can only report that I have recently been
conducting empirical research into the social – as
opposed to juridical – effects of our Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which was adopted in 1982. Making due
allowance for serious methodological difficulties, my study
suggests that the effects of the Charter are barely
discernible: a little forward movement here, a little
backsliding there; but in general the Charter has
transformed legal practice, discourse and thought far
more thoroughly than it has the quality of life of its
intended beneficiaries.
Perhaps there are counter-examples: India and South
Africa come to mind, and possibly Germany. Each of these
countries adopted a new constitutional regime when it
reinvented itself in the aftermath, respectively, of
colonialism, apartheid and national socialism; each opted
for entrenched human, political and social rights; and
each entrusted enforcement of those rights to a judiciary
which has often, if not always, applied them energetically
and imaginatively. However, the question remains: to what
extent has constitutionalism – entrenched rights and
judicial review – actually contributed to social, political or
economic transformation?
That is an empirical question. However, empirical
evidence is hard to come by; and even if we could find
some, it would not necessarily support generalizations
about constitutionalism since each polity, economy,
society and legal culture is the product of unique and
complex historical circumstances. Nonetheless, if we
cannot hope to find general answers, at least we can
legitimately ask a few more pointed questions. To what
extent did the Constitutional Court of South Africa
enhance that country’s already ambitious housing
program, when it famously ruled in 1998 that Mrs
Grootboom’s children had a right to adequate housing?1
How many people were rescued from starvation as a result
of the heroic dictum of the Indian Supreme Court that
they were constitutionally entitled to at least “the bare
necessities of life”?2 If these judgments did have any long-
term, systemic consequences beyond securing relief for
the litigants, there ought to have been a blip in housing
starts, a dip in rates of malnutrition. However, I suspect
that such blips and dips will have been no more in
evidence in India and South Africa than they have been in
Canada since the adoption of our Charter.
And why not? Because constitutional litigation has only
a marginal effect on public policy, practical governance
and the allocation of public goods.
Remember: constitutional litigation does not launch
itself. Someone has to sue. If that person is a corporation
or a wealthy individual, they are not likely to be seeking
to vindicate human rights, cure social wrongs or protect the
general public interest. If the plaintiff is the sort of
person who is usually victimized by “the system” –
someone who typically cannot afford to sue – the burden
of financing the litigation will fall either on an advocacy
group or on the state itself. However, because advocacy
groups are committed to their cause, they tend to make
strategic and tactical judgments about whom to represent,
when to litigate and what arguments to make. Any of these
judgments may skew the way in which issues are presented
and perceived. And as for state funding of constitutional
litigation, you may be interested to know that after twenty-
odd years of funding so-called “Charter challenges”,
Canada’s federal government recently decided that it had
other spending priorities. This decision will ultimately have
a huge effect on the volume, character and outcomes of
Charter litigation – though probably not on everyday life.
Moreover, constitutional litigation is better designed to
remedy individual injustices than to correct systemic
wrongdoing. The nominal plaintiff may frame the issues
in a particular way because of their personal
circumstances, to meet procedural or evidentiary
requirements, or in order to be able to rely on a more
promising constitutional principle rather than a less
promising one. However, the way in which issues are
framed also determines the relevance of evidence and the
cogency of arguments advanced by the parties, not to
mention the grounds upon which judges must ultimately
dispose of them. As a result, the courts are almost certain
to possess a distorted and incomplete understanding of
the system which the litigation is designed to challenge.
The parties – the plaintiff or the government – may
seek to overcome these deficiencies in what the court
knows, and in the issues it can address, in several ways.
They may file affidavits from expert witnesses which
provide background information about the larger issues.
Counsel in argument may point to the dangers of falling
6
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2 Mullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746. More ambitious,
ongoing litigation on the “right to food” has resulted in specific remedial orders.
See PUCL v Union of India and others (Writ petition [Civil] No 196 of 2001) and
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/case/case.html1 Republic of South Africa v Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
skies, slippery slopes or opening wedges – to the potential
harm to citizens, the state or the law. Or judges may take
judicial notice of missing information. None of these is
really satisfactory. Affidavits are typically designed to
persuade, not enlighten; and judges lack both the means
and the mandate to verify, challenge or supplement the
information they contain. Counsel can make arguments
about the issues before the court but not – with propriety
– about issues which are not being litigated, even though
they may be affected by the outcome. And judges may be
entirely mistaken in their personal understanding of how
a system operates or what will be the effect of changing it.
For all of these reasons, it is highly likely that courts will
either overestimate or underestimate the consequences of
their rulings.
The third consideration has to do with the remedial
power of courts. Many of the most egregious and deeply
entrenched injustices have to do with the maldistribution
of power and money. Courts have little or no power to
correct that maldistribution. However, unless welfare
systems, schools, hospitals, police forces, prisons,
immigration offices and other state agencies are given
unlimited resources, to remedy an injustice by ordering
that the plaintiff be treated properly is to run the risk that
someone else will bear the brunt. I do not myself shrink
from saying these organizations ought to be given more
resources, or that those which exist ought to be distributed
according to a different principle than the one which a
court has ruled constitutionally illicit. But courts typically
do shrink from those kinds of statements. They certainly
will not order that taxes or rates should be increased; or
that the budget of one program ought to be cut so that
another can be augmented; or that the plaintiff ’s needs
ought to be met at the expense of someone else similarly
situated.
Nor could they possibly make those orders, even though
such outcomes are almost inevitable. Rather, courts tend
to say to government, “we have decided that what you have
done is wrong; fix it; it’s up to you to figure out how.”
Taking an optimistic view of the matter, such an
admonition often initiates what one distinguished
Canadian constitutionalist calls a “dialogue”, between
courts and governments. And often governments do find
a way to “fix it”, he notes, though occasionally they fail or
decline to do so, with the consequence that the court must
intervene with more specific instructions. But that is not
the whole story. Governments also find ways not to “fix
it”, to continue the very behaviour the court has struck
down. Of course plaintiffs will get their personal remedy
if they win their case. However, governments may pay lip
service to the general principle behind the court’s ruling,
and then find alternative ways to do what the principle
forbids, or simply ignore the ruling altogether secure in
the knowledge that it will be some time before new
litigation can be mounted. These inherent limits on the
remedial power of the courts may help to explain why our
Charter has had such limited practical impact.
The next institutional obstacle to the use of
constitutional litigation to achieve transformative social
outcomes is the character of judges and the nature of the
adjudicative process. Judges are mainly conservative by
instinct and training. Whatever their personal political
predilections, they must adhere to a fairly rigid juridical
canon; they live within an intellectual tradition which
emphasizes continuity and a professional culture which
embraces circumspection; they are therefore
professionally programmed to prefer ancient privileges
over novel claims and established rights over pragmatic
solutions; and – while idiosyncrasies of style and rhetoric
are indulged, even prized – judges routinely employ
symbolic behaviours and discursive strategies which make
their judgments appear neutral, principled, reasonable and
inevitable rather than what they really are: value-laden,
result-driven, contested and contingent.
I draw breath here not only to await chastisement or
worse from our distinguished and honourable chair, Lord
Hope, but also to concede several important points. Not
all judges are conservative in either a legal or political
sense; nor do they all willingly accept the limitations of
ancient precedents and traditional processes; nor – when
they have taken off their gowns and wigs – do they all
deny that contingent circumstances and the search for just
and practical outcomes shape decisions as much as the
application of legal rules and constitutional principles.
But in conceding these points, in acknowledging that many
judges are progressive political actors, well aware that they
are making choices rather than following rules, I am also
stripping constitutional adjudication of some of its
mystique and its utility.
Mystique first: if decisions about fundamental rights are
always and inevitably political in nature, why prefer
clandestine political decision-makers to those who are
democratically elected and accountable? And utility next:
what use is constitutional adjudication if it is not what it
appears to be, if it is, after all, the rule of judges –
however well-intentioned, and not the rule of law –
however ill-considered? These questions, or similar, help
to explain the unseemly struggle to fill the United States
Supreme Court with judges who favour or disfavour
abortion, affirmative action, executive privilege, theocracy
and torture. That struggle for judicial appointments, in my
view, gives the lie to claims that constitutional litigation
exists on a higher plane than ordinary political controversy.
This last point leads me to a final and more fundamental
challenge to court-centred constitutionalism. It is, in a
way, oddly oblivious to the great controversies in legal
thought which have preoccupied scholars over the past
century or more. Let me explain. Constitutionalism
assumes that law can and does shape society, that it changes
minds, that it redistributes resources, that it recalibrates 7
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power. However, since at least the 19th century critics
have persuasively argued – some would say “clearly
demonstrated” – that to the contrary, law is shaped by
society, by culture, by political economy.
Constitutionalism assumes that adjudication is a rational
and principled exercise. However, since the 19th century,
critics have contended that constitutional adjudication is
the continuation of politics by other means, that in
deciding controversial cases judges are heavily influenced
by their own ideological predilections, and that they act
in fairly predictable alliances with like-minded colleagues.
These two critiques are at odds with each other. The
first discounts the effects on society of constitutional
adjudication – and of law in general; the second treats
law – especially constitutional adjudication – as a crucial
site of social, cultural and political contestation.
However, both challenge the claim that because
constitutionalism is ultimately “legal”, it is necessarily
rational, principled, efficacious and legitimate, let alone
indispensable to the governance of modern democracies.
To be sure, practitioners and proponents of
constitutionalism make several responses to this
challenge.
The first proceeds from a fundamental principle: that
majoritarian politics ought not to trump other core values
– such as justice and equality – which are firmly
entrenched in the constitution alongside the right to
speak, assemble or vote. By enforcing respect for the rule
of law and constitutional rights, courts ensure that these
other values will not be overridden by 50 per cent plus one
of the electorate or a simple majority in Parliament. The
second response is more pragmatic: that constitutional
adjudication, far from challenging electoral democracy,
makes it possible; that courts ensure the necessary
preconditions for democratic politics by holding other
state institutions to high standards of fairness, openness
and accountability; and that courts offer practical
recourse to individuals and small communities who
cannot attract the attention or support of more broadly-
based political parties and social movements. In support
of these first two claims, supporters of constitutionalism
remind us that judges consistently rank at the top of
surveys which measure public esteem and that Charters
or Bills of Rights enjoy similarly high levels of public
support.
The third response is a more subtle version of the
second: that the real effects of constitutionalism are not
so much juridical as cultural; that by affirming human
rights and civil liberties, courts legitimate both their
practice and their advocacy; that the very adoption of a
Human Rights Act or its equivalent transforms political
discourse, legislative drafting and administrative
behaviour; that the discourse of rights permeates spheres
of social interaction from business practice to popular
culture.
I acknowledge that these defences of constitutionalism
deserve serious consideration; and they will receive it in
the final version of my lecture. But if I spent the rest of
our time together confronting them, I would neither
persuade you nor reach what, for me, is the real point of
the debate over constitutionalism and of this lecture. That
point, by a happy coincidence, has to do with the common
project of our hosts, the John Coffin Lectureship and the
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. It is this: How does
one think about an idea? And more specifically, how does
one evaluate claims and resolve disagreements about legal
ideas?
WHAT CONSTITUTIONALISM TELLS US
ABOUT LEGAL THOUGHT
If I were lecturing this evening on the beneficial effects
of bloodletting or the healing properties of eye of newt,
you would rightly ask me for evidence. If I produced
“evidence”, you would then do two things. First, you
would ask whether the same evidence is consistent with
other hypotheses; and second you would ask what theory
of causation might explain the beneficial outcomes I have
claimed for these unorthodox forms of medical
intervention. However, most lawyers and judges – and
most legal scholars – are unlikely to ask similar questions
about the effects of constitutionalism.
In a series of epidemiological studies beginning in the
1960s – the so-called Whitehall Studies – the class
background of entrants to the British civil service was
identified as a strong predictor of their health outcomes
and career achievements. A number of plausible
hypotheses have been advanced to explain why: rich
people’s children eat better when they are young so they
are more likely to be healthy later in life; they are more
likely to receive intellectual stimulus in early childhood, so
their brains are “hard-wired” for better performance at
school and at work; these advantages – reinforced, of
course, by class prejudice – improve their chances of
securing attractive entry-level jobs; and the same qualities
give them an edge in securing promotion to challenging
senior positions which, in turn, provide a degree of job
satisfaction which contributes to their improved morbidity
and increased longevity. Empirical studies of the social
determinants of health apparently confirm many of these
hypotheses.
Now let us conduct a thought experiment. What would
a similar study of the social determinants of human, social
and political rights reveal? From the fragmentary evidence
available, I suspect it would show that class background
correlates closely with the enjoyment of all public goods
– of access not only to education, health services, housing
and public sector jobs, but to participation in civic, and
cultural life and to the enjoyment of human, social and
political rights. In other words, the disadvantages poor
people suffer in health and career outcomes is in all
probability replicated in other areas of their lives. They8
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are more likely to encounter abuse at the hands of the
police, welfare authorities and other state functionaries;
they are more likely to experience discrimination in the
workplace; they are less likely to exercise their freedom to
speak, associate, assemble, run for office or vote; and they
are less likely to recognize that they have constitutional or
other rights, let alone to seek, receive or act on legal
advice to vindicate those rights.
If evidence to this effect could be developed, it would
be crucial to any evaluation of claims that the
constitutional entrenchment of rights and access to
effective adjudication will improve the lot of the most
vulnerable people in our society. But astonishingly, there is
no Whitehall study on the social determinants of legal
rights. There is indeed no developed science of legal
epidemiology which would enable a Whitehall study to be
undertaken. Absent such a study, we lawyers tend to
settle for assumptions: that constitutionalism can make
a difference; that clever advocacy, heroic judging and
elegant scholarship can make a difference; that we can
make a difference. These are high-minded assumptions to
be sure, but they are assumptions which are largely
unexplored, likely unsupportable and, ultimately, self-
referential.
It turns out, then, that the history of the idea of
constitutionalism is not so much about specific legal
concepts, forms or practices. It is rather about us and
about how we think about law. In the carrels and offices,
in the reading rooms and lecture halls, of the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies, for the past sixty years, that is
what people have been doing: thinking about law. The
ambition of this lecture has been to persuade them to do
so in a spirit of greater self-awareness and open-
mindedness; to test even the most cherished and noble
assumptions about legal ideas, institutions and processes
more rigorously and empirically; and – yes, I confess – to
explore claims about the transformative potential of
constitutionalism with mischief aforethought.
This lecture began life as the Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest Lecture
presented at the Faculty of Law, University of Cardiff in 2003. It
has metamorphosed considerably thanks to provocative and helpful
suggestions from Roderick Macdonald, Lorne Sossin and Jeremy
Webber.
Harry W Arthurs
University Professor of Law and Political Science Emeritus
And President Emeritus, York University, Toronto, Canada
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